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ABTRACT: In light of recalcitrant global problems such as the prevalence of various levels and 
forms of inequality and increased environmental destruction, there is a growing recognition of 
the limitations, epistemological, political, social, cultural, ethical and ecological, of the modes 
of thought that have dominantly governed and continue to govern our worldview. The 
modernist project, despite various attempts to give voice to those previously denied, has come 
under criticism for tendencies to totalise experience and overlook or exclude differences. On 
the other hand, the postmodernist glorification of difference and tendency to isolate and 
fragment has generated a kind of debilitating uncertainty in the form of absolute relativism 
rendering any pursuit of meaning meaningless. Alongside the recognition of these limitations 
are attempts to overcome the negative effects of these modes of understanding and to create 
new ways of understanding ourselves, our relationship to others, human and non-human and 
to the larger world process in which we find ourselves. Despite the supposed opposition 
between the modern and postmodern projects, the two share in common the tendency to 
undermine another mode of understanding that by its very nature both precludes and 
succeeds them. The mode of understanding referred to is narrative understanding which has 
the potential to pave a middle way between modernity’s totalising exclusions and 
postmodernity’s fragmenting nihilism, furthermore when the narrative approach is seriously 
undertaken it becomes clear that the formerly polarised dominant modes of thought are part 
of a wider, more heterogeneous process. The following article examines and highlights in 
detail some of the problems surrounding the modern and postmodern modes of thought in 
order to demonstrate the usefulness of narrative theory in overcoming these problems. In 
order to augment the defence of narrative theory this article also draws considerably from the 
work of Mikhail Bakhtin whose philosophy, it will be argued, both compliments and enhances 
narrative understanding and has considerable potential for generating a more inclusive and 
creative understanding of humanity, its relationships to others and to the world in which it is 
inextricably linked. 
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The following essay examines and highlights in detail some of the problems 
surrounding the modern and post-modern modes of thought in order to demonstrate 
the usefulness of narrative theory in overcoming these problems. In particular, it 
argues that the abstract theories of both modernism and postmodernism are unfruitful 
for understanding humans as a process of becoming and tend to either limit humans 
to egoistic individuals or hinder the development of identity through fragmentation 
and relativism. It will be argued that modernity, through its tendency to totalise, 
excludes other modes of understanding and the postmodern response to this 
totalisation, an utter respect for and celebration of difference, has rendered the search 
for any kind of meaning unintelligible. In order to overcome these limitations and to 
augment the defence of narrative theory this article draws considerably from the work 
of Mikhail Bakhtin whose philosophy both compliments and enhances narrative 
understanding and has considerable potential in generating a more inclusive and 
creative understanding of humanity, our relationships to others and to the world in 
which we are inextricably linked. Through recognition of the dialogism inherent in 
the world, this article seeks neither to discredit nor destroy the two modes of thought 
in question, but to overcome their limitations and to recognise these modes of thought 
as apart of a wider process of interactive, intersubjective and creative becoming. 
Rather than accepting the modern dogmatism of absolute truths or the postmodern 
scepticism towards truth, it will be argued that narrative understanding, alongside 
Bakhtin’s dialogism, allow for truth to be provisional and alterable in light of an ever 
expanding horizon of understanding.          
In light of continuing global issues including the prevalence of various levels and 
forms of inequality and increased environmental destruction, there is a growing 
recognition of the limitations, epistemological, political, social, cultural, ethical and 
ecological, of the modes of thought that have dominantly governed and continue to 
govern our worldview. Alongside the recognition of these limitations are attempts to 
overcome the negative affects of these modes of understanding and to create new 
ways of understanding ourselves, our relationship to others, human and non-human 
and to the larger world process in which we find ourselves.  
The modernist project, despite various attempts to give voice to those previously 
denied, has come under criticism for tendencies to totalise experience and overlook or 
exclude differences. The orthodox Marxist movement for example aimed to defend 
the proletariat from exploitation but failed to include women in the emancipatory 
endeavour. Similarly, the first wave feminist movement to some extent sought to 
overcome inequality by extending suffrage to women, however their own endeavours 
were limited to white western women and failed to represent women of other cultures.  HANA  M.  OWEN  138 
On the other hand, the post-modern attack on all things modern, its glorification of 
difference and its tendency to isolate and fragment, has generated a kind of 
debilitating uncertainty in the form of absolute relativism rendering any pursuit of 
meaning meaningless.  
Despite the supposed opposition between the modern and postmodern projects, 
the two share the tendency to undermine another mode of understanding that by its 
very nature both precludes and succeeds them. The mode of understanding referred 
to is narrative understanding which has the potential to pave a middle way between 
modernity’s totalising exclusions and post-modernity’s fragmenting nihilism. 
Furthermore, when the narrative approach is seriously undertaken, it becomes clear 
that the formerly polarised dominant modes of thought are both are part of a wider 
more heterogeneous process. 
To begin with, it is important to recognise how the project of modernity has both 
drawn on narrative for its justification yet, at the same time, has undermined it as a 
way of understanding. Although there are definite problems with the periodisation of 
modernity, I will use David Harvey’s definition, as it seems to describe those aspects 
of modernity that were found most unpalatable by its post-modern critics. Quoting 
from the architectural magazine Precis 6, Harvey describes modernity as: 
Generally perceived as positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic, universal 
modernism has been identified as the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, 
the rational planning of ideal social orders, and the standardisation of 
knowledge and production (Harvey 1980:8-9). 
This description of modernity is contrasts with the privileging of:  
Heterogeneity and difference as liberative forces in the redefinition of cultural 
discourse” that is characteristic of postmodernism (Harvey 1980 8-9). The 
indeterminacy of meaning, fragmentation and heterogeneity endorsed by 
postmodernism are effects of, as Lyotard famously states an ‘incredulity towards 
meta-narratives (Lyotard 1984:xxiv ). 
One of the most influential theorists of modernity, Thomas Hobbes, in 
accordance with his egoistic view of humans as self interested machines had stripped 
narrative of any critical significance and relegated it alongside art and poetry as mere 
forms of innocent entertainment “to please and delight ourselves, and others, by 
playing with our words, for pleasure and ornament” (Hobbes 1968:102). Hobbes 
describes the imagination as “nothing but decaying sense” (Hobbes 1968:88) hence 
denying the creative role of narrative and imagination. John Locke also denigrated 
imagination as irrational and actually counselled parents to “stifle and suppress” any 
“fanciful vein” in their children (Kearney 1988:164). The main reason for this   COSMOS AND HISTORY  139 
undermining of narrative and the imagination is the enlightenment’s conviction that 
reason and rationality, above all else, are the key driving force behind the discovery of 
truth and human progress.     
However whilst the key thinkers had been denigrating narratives, art and poetry 
as mere entertainment, their very actions and theories rested on a view of the world 
constituted by a grand narrative of progress. Darwin’s theory of evolution and its 
application to society by the social Darwinists led by Spencer had bolstered the 
European sense of superiority and justified colonisation as the natural and inevitable 
spread of civilisation (Bowler 1992:330, 380, 435). 
As European cultures extended their dominion throughout the world, continued 
to justify the dispossession of other cultures in the name of progress, the voices of the 
dispossessed, and excluded began to surface and oppose the dominant discourses of 
the West. The increasing contact with different cultures and beliefs entailed an 
increasing recognition of the role of culture in constituting truth and values, which in 
turn engendered a more self-reflexive examination of European culture and beliefs. 
The grand narratives of the enlightenment, the spread of supposedly superior 
forms of civilisation through colonisation, the faith in technological and scientific 
progress began to lose their legitimacy as eternal truths. The grand narratives of 
modernity were revealed as ideological, oppressive and Eurocentric. The realisations 
of the ideological role of the grand narratives of the modernist project, including the 
emancipatory religious, Marxist and first wave feminist visions, have greatly 
contributed to the postmodernist incredulity towards metanarratives and distrust of 
“large scale, theoretical interpretations purportedly of universal application” (Watson 
2000:679).  
One of the most profound assaults on the modern mode of thought has come 
from the study of language and in particular from the post-structuralists. Theorists 
such as Lacan, Barthes and Derrida, in stressing the primacy of language and signs in 
human understanding have reduced reality to a linguistic construction. In Écrits, 
Jacque Lacan argues that “it is the world of words that creates the world of things” 
(Lacan 1989:65) and that signifiers derive their value and meaning from other 
signifiers. For example “mother” and “father” are binary terms in a closed system of 
signification where “each sustains its value and meaning through its relations to the 
other and not through any reference to the real” (Silverman 1983:182,188). Roland 
Barthes argues that no work of literature can be conceived as the work of a single 
creative individual (or author) but should instead be conceived as an impersonal play 
of linguistic signs (Kearney 1988: 274).   HANA  M.  OWEN  140 
Perhaps the most influential and radical of the poststructuralist sceptics has been 
Jacques Derrida, who mounts an attack on modernist assumptions by bringing the 
entire basis of western thought into question.  Derrida was thoroughly discontent with 
the modernist views that pervaded his time and reacting against the prevailing French 
structuralist tradition, as an extension of modern philosophy, set about critiquing the 
very foundations upon which the modern world view had rested (Docker 1994:132; 
Watson 2000:630).  
The reason for Derrida’s discontent with western modern philosophy was that it 
tended to be totalising and essentialist in its search for a definite centre or 
fundamental ground within a structure that could explain everything about that 
structure. Western philosophy, according to Derrida, is dominated by a metaphysics 
of presence that results from the hierarchical ordering of exclusive binary oppositions 
where one of which is assumed to be prior to and superior to the other (Docker 
1994:137; Ryan 13:1982; Derrida 1972:249; Gare 1996:169). For example within the 
western modes of thought identity precedes otherness, speech precedes writing, and 
reality precedes imagination and so on. What these originary concepts share in 
common is the condition of presence from which the secondary, oppositional 
concepts are derived. Derrida writes that: 
The history of metaphysics, like the history of the west, is the history of these 
metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix…is the determination of being as 
presence in every sense of the word (Derrida 1972:249). 
In the sense that the originary concepts are believed to be prior to and superior to 
their oppositions by virtue of their presence, which also allows for a reassuring 
certainty or “presence of meaning”, these concepts serve as the foundations upon 
which western metaphysics is constructed (Docker 1994:132). This certainty or 
presence of meaning is what Derrida refers to as logocentrism, a term that is derived 
from Derrida’s charge that in western thought speech has always been favoured over 
writing due to its situatedness which allows for a presence of meaning to be derived 
from the context in which it is uttered and the presence of speaking subjects. Writing, 
on the other hand, due to the absence of the author does not allow such certainty and 
resists being pinned down or finalised, instead allowing for a free play of meanings 
that exceeds the immediacy of speech (Docker 1994:136; Belsey 1980:115; Ryan 
1982:29). 
The problem with western metaphysics and its logocentrism is that in separating 
and representing things as oppositional and privileging one thing over the other 
represses anything that might trouble the originary thing (Gare 1996:169). The centres 
or fundamental grounds established by the hierarchical oppositions of western   COSMOS AND HISTORY  141 
metaphysics fix the structures built around them in a permanent state of immobility 
or fixed truth (Docker 1994:132; Ryan 1982:10). 
An example of the binary, hierarchical oppositions of western thought and their 
rigidity can be seen in the theory of psychological egoism which can be seen as a 
manifestation of the identity-other dualism in the sense that it envisages the individual 
as an autonomous agent for whom the other is a mere instrument. A psychological 
egoist believes that all human beings are essentially self interested and that all human 
behaviour and action, is motivated by the self interested fulfilment of individual needs 
and desires (Rachels 2003:64). This originary premise of psychological egoism 
becomes a controlling assumption which denies any other conception of the nature of 
human beings by interpreting everything, including altruistic behaviour, to fit the 
controlling assumption that all humans are self interested (Rachels 2003:64). This 
m a k e s  e g o i s m  t o  s o m e  e x t e n t  i r r e f u t a b l e ,  a s  i t  i s  a b l e  t o  a b s o r b  a n d  t r a n s f o r m  
phenomena that might challenge it, into further evidence for its truth. Because the 
foundational centre of egoism has been so successful in absorbing its opposition it has 
been developed further by theorists such as Ayn Rand to apply to the realm of ethics 
where the assumption that humans are essentially self interested becomes humans ought 
to be self interested (Rachels 2003:80-81).   
Derrida’s practice of deconstruction consists in upending the hierarchical 
oppositions to show that the secondary concepts are in fact more primordial than the 
supposed originary concepts (Ryan 1982:10). Deconstruction refuses to allow a definite 
foundation for anything. Michael Ryan puts it quite succinctly: 
Deconstruction reveals beneath the foundation of metaphysics an indefinite root 
system that nowhere touches ground in a transcendental instance that would 
itself  be without roots or ancestors (Ryan 1982:11). 
Hence, Derrida writes: 
...in the absence of a centre or origin, everything becomes discourse…that is to 
say when everything became a system where the central signified, the original or 
transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of 
differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and 
the interplay of signification ad infinitum. (Derrida 1972:249). 
 In other words, if these centres or foundations are removed we begin to see reality 
and truth as an infinite play of signs: 
...always open to interpretation without end, unconfined, unreduced, 
unfinalised, untotalised, not continuous, not linear, where truth is never arrived 
at, is always involved in a play of differences, that keep deferring its arrival, its 
full presence (Docker 1994:132-133).   HANA  M.  OWEN  142 
The lack of presence of a fundamental ground or centre entails an endless play of 
signifiers with no fixed reality outside of this play which leads Derrida to discourage 
referring a text to any fixed references outside the text either psychological, 
metaphysical or historical (Docker 1994:137). Hence Derrida’s famous assertion that 
“there is nothing outside of the text” (Docker 1994:137).  
Poststructuralist theory has been widely received in contemporary culture and has 
assisted in the acceptance of theories of relativism (Belsey 1980:118). However while 
many intellectuals of the post industrial age have sought to deal with problems of 
exclusion and dogmatism that have come t o  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  m o d e r n i s t ,  
foundationalist philosophy through relativism and the acknowledgement of plurality, 
relativism, especially in its absolute form, can lead to vulgar individualism and ethical 
subjectivism which both can be apolitical and amoral. 
A s  a  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  p o s t m o d e r n i s m ,  r e l a t i v i s m  c a n  b e  s e e n  a s  a  f o r m  o f  
fragmentation that does take into account contexts but at the same time seems to 
draw boundaries around these contexts so that they become isolated, fragmentary 
contexts and in doing so they essentially deny the other, and deny anything that might 
challenge them. While egoism’s foundational centre is based on the belief that all 
human beings are essentially self interested which limits the possibilities of what 
humans can be, the foundational truth of relativism is that all truth is relative, or more 
radically, that there is no truth. These statements apply to their own premises, that is 
to say, if all truth is relative then the statement that all truth is relative is also relative 
and if there is no truth then this statement is untrue (Tarnas 1991:402;  Kearney 
1988:360).  
In this sense absolute relativism is somewhat defeatist and nihilistic in denying the 
possibility of truth and does not give any reason for the meaningful pursuit of 
understanding or philosophy as there is purportedly nothing there to pursue. David 
Harvey admits that in the post-modern view of the world “elements of nihilism are 
encouraged” and there is a return to narrow and sectarian politics in which “respect 
for others gets mutilated in the fires of competition between the fragments” (Harvey 
1980:351) 
So amongst postmodernism’s purported respect for the other through diversity 
and heterogeneity there is also a tendency to divide humanity into distinct isolated 
groups. Moreover the fragmentation and incoherence of postmodernism entails a 
kind of debilitating anxiety in the face of absolute and infinite relativity, a social and 
cultural anomie where, as Tarnas put’s it: 
....in the absence of any viable, embracing cultural vision, old assumptions 
remain blunderingly in force, providing an increasingly unworkable and 
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Both egoism and relativism are difficult to dispute. They seem to be capable of 
explaining everything according to their basic underlying premises through denying 
everything else. It is significant that egoism which is very easily identified as 
foundationalist has survived to this day and is still used in economic theory as the 
basis of human motivation through the notion of homo economicus despite post-modern 
criticism of foundationalism (Daly & Cobb 1989:85-86,89). Relativism, which 
postmodernists invoke as an alternative to modernist foundationalism, is still 
foundationalist and like egoism, is used to justify vulgar individualism and 
subjectivism in ethics. Both these ideas are identifiable in the dominant neo-liberal 
discourse of contemporary society and in the mechanistic world orientation 
underlying the acceptance of neo-liberalism, which also excludes other discourses. 
What is also alarming about postmodernism’s embrace of all things relative is that it 
not only prohibits the criticism of the cultural codes and practices of other societies 
but also our own, it thus undermines any notion of social reform and stagnates culture 
(Rachels 2003:22).   
Derrida was also a critic of the traditional modernist subject of knowledge, who is 
believed to be able to remove himself from the context in which he is studying and 
maintain an objective and neutral or value free stance. Derrida believed that we can 
never fully escape the inherited conventions and concepts of our culture and 
Deconstruction refers to the attempt to construct a criticism or analysis of a culture 
that recognises its own identification with that culture that it criticises. As discussed 
above, despite criticism of foundationalist, universalising modernism, egoism still 
prevails in contemporary thought. Likewise, the post-modern inclination towards 
relativity can be seen as a reversal of the binary hierarchy between the universal and 
the relative where the universal was once perceived as the centre. Moreover, as 
Tarnas points out, the fragmenting tendencies of postmodernism has generated a kind 
of indifference and confusion, which has allowed for older assumptions, such as 
egoism, to remain unchallenged (Tarnas 1991:409).       
Derrida himself is unable to escape the tendencies of western thought that he 
attacks so passionately. Derrida appears to assume that all Western thought is 
characterised by the pursuit of certainty, all western thought is totalising, all western 
thought is characterised by hierarchical binary oppositions (Docker 1994:140). John 
Docker, also drawing on Edward Said’s critique of Derrida, has pointed out at least 
three major inconsistencies in Derrida’s work, particularly in Of Grammatology. Firstly, 
Derrida totalises all western thought as a desire for certitude. Secondly, whilst 
claiming that a linear concept of time is apart of the logocentrism inherent in western 
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historical narrative of theoretical ideas that seems to progress towards the self reflexive 
practice of deconstruction (Docker 1994:140). Fleming also points this out: 
the terms in which Derrida carries out his questioning of the linear notion of 
time are temporal. Western philosophy is bounded in time: it stretches from 
Aristotle to Hegel…The content of Derrida’s philosophy is both bounded in 
time, and contains time (by placing itself with respect to earlier philosophy) 
(Fleming 1995:113-114). 
Lastly, in augmenting his vision of modern thought as totalising, Derrida references a 
highly selective list of influential thinkers such as Rousseau and Levi-Strauss whilst 
failing to include others such as Vico, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Rabelais or Joyce who 
all have elements of deconstructivism and anti-logocentrism inherent in their work 
(Docker: 1994:142). In this sense, Derrida is guilty of his own accusations against the 
suppression of contradiction and difference (1994:142).          
In light of this how can the precarious road between universalising modernism 
and relativising postmodernism be navigated? In other words, how can we overcome 
the totalising, exclusionary habits of modernity whilst avoiding the nihilistic, 
fragmenting tendencies of postmodernism that insists on reducing knowledge and 
meaning to “a rubble of signifiers”? (Harvey 1980:350). It is at this point that the work 
of the Bakhtinian circle and narrative theory may help to guide the direction of this 
inquiry. 
Bakhtin anticipates Derrida’s concern with the binary, hierarchical oppositions of 
western thinking and their logocentrism. In Bakhtin’s writings, texts that attempt to 
establish a fixed truth or that repress otherness are referred to as monological. Bakhtin 
would claim that relativists “assuming that all descriptions are arbitrary…leave us 
with an infinity of monologisations” (Morson & Emerson 1990:59). Bakhtin writes 
“both relativism and dogmatism equally exclude all argumentation, all authentic 
dialogue, by making it either unnecessary (relativism) or impossible (dogmatism)” 
(Bakhtin 1984:69). In Bakhtinian thought naturally in the sense that both the modern 
conception of egoism and the postmodern concepts of relativism and subjectivism 
insist on the truth of their premises to the exclusion and denial of anything otherwise, 
they can both be considered as “two sides of the same coin” (Morson & Emerson 
1990:26).  
Bakhtin attempts to overcome monologism not through relativism or the denial of 
the possibility of philosophy or reducing truth to a “rubble of signifiers” (Harvey 
1980:350). Instead Bakhtin, defending perhaps the most noble aspect of 
postmodernism; the recognition of plurality and otherness, overcomes monologism 
through defending both the qualities of polyphony and through the concept of 
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Polyphony enables a transgression of binary oppositions through the generation of 
non-exclusive, non hierarchical oppositions engaged in an unending dialogical play 
“Bakhtin’s levelling undoes binarisms and overturns hierarchies” (Stam:1989:159). In 
particular, Bakhtin reveres Dostoyevsky’s works and the aspects of polyphony 
inherent in them that present a multiple of diverse voices interacting and colliding 
without resolution (Docker 1994:170).  The characters of Dostoyevsky’s novels are: 
not voiceless slaves but “free people capable of standing alongside their creator, 
capable of not agreeing with him, and even of rebelling against him” (Docker 
1994:170). 
This new kind of character ‘carries his own idea which develops “at a distance” from 
the author’ (Morson & Emerson 1990:9). The multiple discourses in these novels 
interact and interplay, challenge each other and never resolve such play in a unified, 
finalised or monological meaning (Docker 1994:179). 
That the polyphonic texts are in an endless dialogical play that resists finalisation 
does not necessarily mean that they need be relativistic and hence amoral or 
apolitical. Bakhtin’s ideas are able to resist absolute relativism because they are able to 
unify and recognise dialogical interplay while relativism tends to separate and hence 
isolate individuals and cultures. Relativism insists that a culture should be 
autonomous from other cultures, that it should be understood through its own 
cultural standards, conventions or worldview and not undermined or challenged by 
others that assume superiority, in other words that all cultures are incommensurable 
(Macionis & Plummer 2005:119). The avoidance of relativism is achieved through 
dissolving the exclusivity of binary opposition and their hierarchy and instead 
recognising that there is a little of this in that and vice versa so that all oppositions are 
dependent on each other for existence which in turn unifies them, much like the 
concept of Yin Yang (Jung 1998:99).   
Polyphony, Bakhtin explains can be seen in the carnivalesque, which  can be 
described as a mode of folk culture that constitutes a second life outside of the 
confines of the official realm with its closed and dominant orthodoxies (Bakhtin 
1994:197). This second world is characterized by its oppositional nature and 
ambivalence. It asserts and denies, buries and revives, ridicules and abuses yet praises 
and celebrates; it refuses to distinguish between text and context, between actor and 
spectator, between civilized and primitive, vice and virtue and between truth and 
fiction, life and art. (Bakhtin 1994:200, Neofotistos 2008:13,16,17, Torchin 2008:58, 
Closson 2008:6, Furey 2000:134, Stam 1989:20). 
This refusal of the carnival, polyphonic narrative to define things in strict 
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implies an alternative logic of non-exclusive opposites and permanent 
contradiction that transgresses the monologic true or false thinking typical of 
Western rationalism. 
This is achieved through the “oxymoronic carnival aesthetic in which everything is 
pregnant with its opposite” (Stam 1989:22). 
Through this emphasis on ambivalence Bakhtin does not, like Derrida, totalize 
western thought as the result of a desire for certitude but instead argues that from 
early in the history of folk culture the world has been seen in a skeptical double aspect 
where complex systems of meaning exist alongside and in opposition to the closed 
orthodoxy of the time (Docker 1994:185). This can be seen in Jameson’s argument 
that supposed radical epochal changes like that from modernism to postmodernism 
actually consists in the interchanging of aspects all already present in a given society 
or time: 
Radical breaks between periods do not generally involve complete changes of 
content but rather the restructuration of a certain number of elements already 
given: Features that in an earlier period or system were subordinate now 
become dominant and features that had been dominant again become 
secondary (Jameson 1983:123).  
Bakhtin gives evidence for this double aspect of the world with numerous examples of 
the ambivalence inherent in folk culture. For example he contrasts the official feast 
where rank and hierarchy are reinforced by the display of uniform and seating 
arrangements to the carnival feast where people 
entered a utopian realm of community, freedom, equality and abundance”, 
where “a special form of free and familiar contact reigned among people who 
were usually divided by the barriers of caste, property, profession and age 
(Bakhtin 1994:199).  
 What is particularly important about Bakhtin’s thinking is that it is regenerative. 
While Derrida and the relativists insist on the undecidability of meaning, Bakhtin 
insists on the unfinalisability of meaning, which allows for meaning or truth to be 
present, even if provisional, and also allows for this meaning to change and adapt to 
changing circumstances in the dynamic process of becoming. According to Bakhtin 
for creativity to be genuinely creative, it cannot proceed entirely by destruction 
(Morson & Emerson 1990:42). Unlike relativism or Deconstruction, Carnivalesque 
humor, in degrading an object does not merely dismiss it or hurl it into a void of non-
existence, nor does it assume superiority over it and directly oppose it but instead 
carnival ambivalent laughter is a laughter that recognizes it is apart of that which it 
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conceptions. Bakhtin says that “Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they 
live in it”, the festive laughter of the people is universal and does not exclude those 
who laugh “he who is laughing also belongs to it” (Bakhtin 1994:198,200,201, Stam 
1989:94) In this sense carnival laughter is not destructive and does not deny but is 
instead, in its inclusiveness regenerative. In discussing the concept of degradation, 
Bakhtin talks about how degradation does not merely hurl its object into a void of 
non-existence or absolute destruction but instead “hurls it into the reproductive lower 
stratum, the zone in which conception and a new birth take place” (Bakhtin 
1994:206).  
Volosinov, like Bakhtin, refuses to allow that there is a fixed meaning in anything, 
and insists that the importance of a linguistic form is not that it stands for the same 
thing but that it is variable. This is because understanding proper for Volosinov takes 
place at the point of verbal interaction and is always a response (Volosinov 1973:69). 
This statement reflects Bakhtin’s emphasis on the liminality of understanding and the 
importance of the other through the idea of a “surplus of seeing” exclusive to the 
other. The surplus of seeing refers to the special information that is in each person by 
virtue of his or her outsideness. The subject is able to understand his joint existence 
through combining his unique position and the surplus of seeing that it enables with 
those of others who will see and know different things still, enabling a widened 
horizon of understanding for all parties (Holquist 1990a:37). In other words, “my 
excess is your lack, and vice versa. If we wish to overcome this lack, we try to see what 
is there together. We must share each other’s excess in order to overcome our mutual 
lack” (Holquist 1990b:xxvi). What Bakhtin terms as ‘creative understanding’ occurs 
when rather than merely understanding a text “as the author himself understood it” 
the person who is experiencing the understanding recognises the integrity of the text 
and seeks to “supplement it” (Bakhtin 1986b:141). 
Creative understanding does not renounce itself, its own place in time, its own 
culture; and it forgets nothing.  In order to understand it is immensely important 
for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her 
creative understanding- in time, in space, in culture (Bakhtin 1979:7). 
This kind of understanding is “active and creative by nature. Creative understanding 
continues creativity and multiplies the artistic wealth of humanity” (Bakhtin 
1986b:141). The Dialogic understanding of the Bahktinian circle recognises the 
incompleteness of meaning and allows for an orientation in the dynamic process of 
becoming (Volosinov 1973:69). 
Bakhtin’s understanding of language differs from both modernist and 
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Personalists (i.e. Humanists) maintain that the source of meaning is the unique 
individual. Deconstructionists locate meaning in the structure of the general 
possibility of difference underlying all particular differences. Bakhtin roots 
meaning in the social (Clark & Holquist 1984:11-12). 
It is this emphasis on language as parole, as always situated in the dialogical 
elements of everyday life as apart of a unique social situation that informs his 
understanding of meaning. This underlies his belief that all texts are semantically 
unrepeatable due to their unique situatedness in the social and the dialogical, and the 
belief that the true essence of the text develops dialogically on the boundary between 
(at least) two consciousnesses (Bakhtin 1986a:106). “In the act of understanding, a 
struggle occurs that results in mutual change and enrichment” (Bakhtin 1981:349-50).   
The emphasis on dialogism in Bakhtin’s work lends itself quite readily to theories 
that relate identity formation to narrative. Bakhtin believed that both the project of 
language and the project of selfhood exist to mean (Holquist 1990: 23). Theorists such 
as Paul Ricoeur, Richard Kearney, Alasdair Macintyre, David Carr and Arran Gare 
have all argued that narrative is intrinsically linked to identity formation, for both 
individuals and groups.  Paul Ricouer has stressed that narrative is intrinsically linked 
to the way in which humans understand their temporal existence: 
time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative 
mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of 
temporal existence (1983:52). 
Similarly Polkinghorne has argued that “narrative is a cognitive process that organises 
human experience into temporally meaningful episodes” (1988:1). Narratives are 
argued to bring a sense of past and future to the self and to provide unity and purpose 
to life (Rappaport 1993; McAdams 1993:110, also cited in de Peuter 1998:37). Richard 
Kearney summarises the narrative constitution of identity as such: 
you recount your present condition in the light of past memories and future 
anticipations. You interpret where you are now in terms of where you have 
come from and where you are going. And so doing you give a sense of yourself 
as a narrative identity that perdures and coheres over a lifetime (2002:4). 
David Carr has stressed the importance of narrative in the constitution of communal 
identity arguing that: 
At whatever level of size or degree of complexity, a community exists wherever a 
narrative account exists of a we  which has continuous existence through its 
experiences and activities (Carr 1986:163). 
MacIntyre goes as far to say that “man is, in his actions and practice, as well as in his 
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primordial role of narrative in the creation of the self, and of culture, and in all social 
and intellectual life (Gare 2007: 95).   
Narrative is characterised by an inherent orientation towards others. All stories, 
no matter how diverse, share the common function of “someone telling something to 
someone about something” (Kearney 2002:5). There is always at least an implied 
audience. Thus, narrative can be defined as an intersubjective form of discourse or 
communicative act (Kearney 2002: 4). In the same sense, all utterances for Bakhtin 
are characterised by an ‘addressivity’ or an orientation toward others, real or 
hypothetical (Bakhtin 1986a:126; Morson & Emerson 1990:131; Lodge 1990:21). 
Bakhtin’s view of words and utterances is characterised by an inherent belief in the 
inter-textual, intersubjectiveness of communication: “The word in living conversation 
is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer word” (Bakhtin 1981:280).  
The word wants to be heard, understood, responded to and again to respond to 
the response ad infinitum. It enters into a dialogue that does not have a semantic 
end (Bakhtin 1986a:127).  
While there are many aspects of Bakhtin’s work are complementary to theories of 
the narrative self there are none the less a few ways in which Bakhtin’s approach 
differs from most contemporary narrative theory. According to de Peuter, much 
contemporary theory on the narrative self is limited by an implicit bias that privileges 
synthesis, singularity, integration, progress, and authenticity (1998:33). This emphasis 
on the centripetal in narrative theory, the attempts to make sense of everything 
through integrating them into a coherent whole authored from a centralised position 
is monological as it “risks silencing the dynamic tensions that ensure the 
unfinalisability of the self” (de Peuter 1998:41-42). This aspect of the narrated self is 
still highly informed by the modern tendency to privilege unity and finality over 
disunity and the infinite. On the other hand there is a privileging of the centrifugal in 
postmodern theory which tends to fragment, disunify and rob the subject of any 
meaningful ideological framework from which to render the self intelligible hence 
Barthes ‘death of the author’ or Foucault’s ‘the death of man’ (Kearney 1998:265, 
271;de Peuter 1998:41). 
The Bakhtinian approach tends to treat coherence and incoherence, the 
centripetal and the centrifugal, synthesis and fragmentation as equal dialogical 
partners (de Peuter 1998:37, 40, 44-45). This approach adheres to the open endlessness 
and unfinalisability of Bakhtin’s dialogical worldview (Morson & Emerson 1990:42). 
Bakhtin believed that history must be understood as neither random nor completely 
ordered…neither of which would allow for a genuine “becoming” (Morson & 
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derived from and constituted by an autonomous self and instead insists on the self as 
“extraterritorial, partially “located outside” and refers to the “nonself-sufficiency” of 
the self (Morson & Emerson 1990:50). For Bakhtin, the self, like understanding, is 
enacted liminally on the boundaries between self and other, identity and difference. 
The irreducible role of the other in Bakhtinian thought is exemplified in his view 
that the possibility of narrative self, the possibility of conceiving a self in terms of a 
beginning, middle and end is “always enacted in the time/space of the other” 
(Holquist 1990a:37). Michael Holquist describes this nonself-sufficiency of the 
narrative self quite succinctly: 
within my own consciousness my “I” has no beginning and no end. The only 
way I know of my birth is through accounts of it I have from others; and I shall 
never know my death, because my “self” will only be alive so long as I have 
consciousness- what is called “my” death will not be known by me, but once 
again only by others (1990a:37). [M]y own beginning and end exist only as 
potentials in my consciousness, while the birth and death of others appear to me 
to be irreversibly real (1990a:166) 
The conception of the self story as created dialogically and liminally can help 
overcome the limitations of the individual life which when conceived of as 
autonomous and whole can be fragmented from the larger life process of others, of 
humanity and of the world. In light of this, the narrative of an unique individual’s life 
can be conceived of as an inter-narrative. This intersubjective aspect of the narrative 
self is echoed in Alasdair MacIntyres statement that “we are never more (and 
sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own narratives’ (2007:213). The narratives 
of others, as pointed out above, contribute a surplus of seeing that is unavailable to 
the subject, which at the same time constitutes the narrative identity of the subject by 
allowing for the subject to know his/her beginning through the narratives of these 
others and the role that he/she may play in them. The death of the subject is also an 
experience that is inaccessible to the subject but can be made significant insofar as his 
narrative has merged with those of others so that his death may become apart of both 
his own and the others story. Both theories of narrative identity and dialogism 
overcome modernity’s totalising visions of the human self such as that of egoism, 
while at the same time also overcome the fragmentation of post-modernity’s self.    
The conception of an open ended, dialogical meaning opposes the mechanistic 
conception of human beings (that human beings are essentially machines with 
replaceable parts that are moved only by their appetites and aversions) by recognising 
human beings as essentially creative and unfinished beings within a continuous 
process of dialogically interactive becoming, or as unfinished narratives. As Holquist 
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it has been given the task of not being merely given. It must stand out in 
existence because it is dominated by a “drive to meaning”, where meaning is 
understood as something still in the process of creation, something still bending 
toward the future as opposed to that which is already created (1990a:23). 
Bakhtin’s work also has an ethical dimension. The neo-Kantians and Russian 
Formalists had privileged abstract universal laws as guidelines for judging ethical 
actions. For Bakhtin privileging the abstract essentially leads away from responsibility 
and ethical action instead of towards it as it places the most important aspect of the 
act outside the responsible self participating in the event itself (Bender 1998:187). 
Bakhtin instead privileges prosaic, participatory thinking (Bender 1998:187). For 
Bakhtin, morality must be a matter of “the historical concreteness of the individual 
fact… and not the theoretical truth of a proposition” (Bakhtin 1986c:84). In this sense 
Bakhtin’s ethical theories are more aligned with Alasdair McIntyre’s virtue ethics than 
with any other theories of morality due to the emphasis on the active examination of 
the unique particularities of each situation. Ethics should not be a matter of passively 
appealing to some universal law but should instead be an active endeavour to live 
rightly from moment to moment and attend carefully to the irreducible particularities 
of each case (Morson & Emerson 1990:25). 
Bakhtin believed that “An independent, responsible and active discourse is the 
fundamental indicator of an ethical, legal and political human being” (Bakhtin 1981: 
349-50). Like the utterance, actions are believed to be unrepeatable as they are always 
uniquely situated and performed by uniquely situated individuals who are always 
responsible for that unique position. Ethical action is born of a sense that each act is 
unrepeatable and responsibility is non-transferable:  
We are always creating ourselves and our world.  Prosaically from moment to 
moment, our actions matter and have moral value…just as utterances are 
unrepeatable, so actions can be performed once and only once by a given 
person. Neither speech nor ethical action can ever be merely an instantiation of 
rules (Morson & Emerson 1990: 171). 
Again Macintyre’s views are on par with those of Bakhtin in regards to the non 
transferability of ethical responsibility: 
To be the subject of a narrative that runs from one’s birth to one’s death is…to 
be accountable for the actions and experiences which compose a narratable life 
(2007:217) 
Furthermore, MacIntyre’s outline of ethical responsibility does not stop at the 
individual. As an individual’s narrative is always apart of a set of interlocking 
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other’s narratives are apart of the individuals’, responsibility is correlative and 
reciprocal. An individual who is accountable for his or her stories is also permitted to 
ask an account of others (2007:218). 
Bakhtin champions the novel as a potent educational tool for enriching people’s 
moral sense of particular situations. While many philosophical case studies such as the 
prisoner’s dilemma and even real life case studies tend to fall short, especially in 
imparting the numerous particulars such as the mindset of each participant before the 
encounter or their histories, novels and narratives give a more thorough 
understanding of these particulars. Superior to these philosophical and real life case 
studies would be:  
the case studies extending over hundreds of pages and locating the moments to 
be considered in the network of all concerned persons, together with their 
histories, and perceptions, and describing all these events within their 
multivalent social milieu. Far superior, in short, would be the rich and “thick” 
accounts found in great novels (Morson & Emerson 1990:27). 
When we recognise the dialogical nature of all understanding, we are able to see 
postmodernism in its denial of all truth as apart of a dialogical interplay within a 
grand narrative that has in part resulted from the challenges to modernism resulting 
from dialogism. Deconstruction as a postmodern practice can be seen, according to 
Kearney as a symptom of the break up of western culture and its metaphysical 
foundations (Kearney 1988:387).  
A major contributing factor to this break up is the inclusion of the voices of 
various others previously denied. The post-modern incredulity toward the grand 
narratives of the enlightenment as well as religious and Marxist grand narratives can 
be seen as a reaction to the monologic character of these discourses that has been 
identified through dialogical inclusion. Postmodernism too is inevitably challenged by 
such dialogic interplay, opening the way for new understandings and creating another 
chapter in the open book of humanity. 
In  The wake of the imagination, Richard Kearney concludes that in order to 
overcome the apocalyptic nihilism of post-modernity, the post post-modern 
imagination needs to be poetical, historical and ethical. While Bakhtin goes 
unmentioned in the overall work it can be argued that Bakhtin’s ideas and their 
application to narrative theory seem to fit Kearney’s criteria. Firstly, they attend to 
the historical need though the concept of the polyphonic narrative, which can allow 
the imagination to “transfigure the post-modern present by refiguring lost narratives 
and prefiguring future ones” (Kearney 1988:393). As Bakhtin consistently emphasises, 
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expanding horizons of understanding, the present that we are experiencing now is not 
inevitable and could have been, and still could be, otherwise. Bakhtin’s work also has 
much in common with what Kearney calls for in an ethical imagination. Kearney 
emphasises, like Bakhtin and MacIntyre, that ethical action does not mean uncritical 
action, and that it demands constant discernment. On top of this Kearney’s ethical 
imagination is one that is responsive to the other. If Bakhtin’s theory on the self as 
constituted inter-subjectively on the border between self and other is taken seriously, 
then it is also more likely, upon realising this integral role of the other, that we will be 
more likely to respond to and take responsibility for the needs of the other. Finally, 
Kearney calls for a poetical imagination and states, “the imagination needs to play 
because it is ethical” (1988:366). As mentioned earlier, Bakhtin champions the novel 
for its ability to put before us experiments in ethics uniquely situated in specific places 
or times with specific actors. In this sense Bakhtin, like Kearney, sees the importance 
of narrative and the arts for allowing such imaginative play, which bolsters our ability 
to judge right and wrong according to specifics. This need not only apply to other 
humans and as Kearney observes, is apart of the “power of the poetic imagination to 
transcend the limits of egocentric, and indeed anthropocentric, consciousness” 
(1988:367).       
In this essay, I have argued that the abstract theories of both modernism and 
postmodernism are unfruitful for understanding the human being as a process of 
becoming. Modernity is guilty of exclusion through its totalising tendencies and post-
modernity, through its tendency to fragment has rendered the search for any kind of 
meaning unintelligible or fruitless. Both the modern and the postmodern have 
undermined the integrity of narrative in identity formation through reducing it to 
mere entertainment. In the Bakhtinian spirit, I have not attempted to discredit or 
destroy either but have proposed that the most destructive aspects of the two may be 
neutralised by allowing for a recognition of the dialogism inherent in the world as a 
part of a wider process of interactive, intersubjective and creative process of 
becoming. Rather than accepting that there is an absolute truth, or accepting that 
there is no truth, Bakhtin’s dialogism allows truth to be provisional and alterable in 
light of an ever expanding horizon of understanding.  
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